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Self-defense: reasonable beliefs or reasonable self-control? 
by 
Kenneth Simons* 
Draft: October 28, 2007 
Abstract:  
 The reasonable person test is often employed in criminal law 
doctrine as a criterion of cognitive fault:  Did the defendant unreasonably 
fail to appreciate a risk of harm, or unreasonably fail to recognize a legally 
relevant circumstance element (such as the nonconsent of the victim)?  But 
it is sometimes applied more directly to conduct: Did the defendant depart 
sufficiently from a standard of reasonable care, e.g. in operating a motor 
vehicle, that he deserves punishment?  A third version of the reasonable 
person criterion, which has received much less attention, asks what degree 
of control a reasonable person would have exercised.  Many criminal acts 
occur in highly emotional, stressful, or emergency situations, situations in 
which it is often both unrealistic and unfair to expect the actor to formulate 
beliefs about all of the facts relevant to the legality or justifiability of his 
conduct. A “reasonable degree of self-control” criterion is sometimes the 
best criterion for embracing these contextual factors. 
 In self-defense, for example, it is conventional to ask whether the 
actor believes, and whether a reasonable person would believe, each of the 
following facts: (a) an aggressor was threatening him with harm, (b) that 
harm would be of a particular level of gravity, (c) his use of force in 
response would prevent that harm, (d) the level of responsive force he 
expects to employ would be of a similar level of gravity, (e) if the force was 
not used, the threatened harm would occur immediately, and (f) no 
nonviolent or less forceful alternatives were available whereby the threat 
could be avoided.  United States law typically requires an affirmative 
answer to each of these questions.  Yet in many cases, an actor threatened 
with harm will actually have no beliefs at all about most of these matters.  It 
would be unfair to deny a full defense to all such actors.  At the same time, 
we should still hold such an actor to a normative standard of justifiable 
behavior.  Specifically, this essay suggests that we reformulate the 
reasonableness criterion and require this type of actor to exercise a 
reasonable degree of self-control in response to a threat of force. 
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 "Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted 
knife."1  With these famous words, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declined to impose 
a broad duty to retreat before an actor may use deadly force in self-defense.  The 
phrase has been endlessly repeated in subsequent self-defense cases, and has 
typically been invoked to emphasize that it would be unfair to expect an actor to 
make accurate assessments and predictions when suddenly, violently attacked.  
Such actors will inevitably form mistaken beliefs, the phrase suggests.  But what if 
these extreme circumstances cause not only an absence of reflection, but an 
absence of any beliefs at all about some of the facts that are legally necessary to 
provide the actor with a full defense of self-defense?  The dominant cognitive 
conception of self-defense doctrine must give an unsatisfying answer: this actor 
loses the right to self-defense.  An alternative conception of self-defense doctrine 
can explain why he need not lose that right. 
 
I.   The problem 
 
 Standard American2 criminal law doctrine provides that one can only use a 
certain degree of force in self-defense if one honestly and reasonably believes that a 
                                                 
1 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
2 Only four American jurisdictions, it appears, adopt a purely subjective test of self-defense.  
See Kevin Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man?, A Sympathetic But Critical Assessment of 
the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonbleness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 
26 American Journal of Criminal Law 1, 57 & Appendix (1998). 
 Interestingly enough, English law does not require a “reasonable” belief in the 
relevant facts in order to grant a full defense; an honest belief suffices. See Andrew 
Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law §4.7 (g), at 147 (5th ed. 2006); id. at §6.5, p. 230  (“[A] 
putative defence will succeed wherever D raises a reasonable doubt that he actually held the 
mistaken belief, no matter how outlandish that belief may have been.”).  However, Ashworth 
also believes that the subjective test might have to be changed to an objective, reasonable 
person test in order to conform with the view of the European Court of Human Rights that the 
actions of those who kill must be evaluated on the basis of facts that “they honestly believed, 
for good reason, to exist.”  Id. §4.7 (g), at 147.  It is also surprising that English legislation and 
judicial decisions do little to specify or clarify the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.  Id. at §4.7(d), §139. 
 German law differs from Anglo-American law in employing a more lenient 
proportionality requirement: the response is unjustifiable only if it is grossly disproportionate 
to the threat.  See T. Markus Funk, Justifying Justifications, 19 Oxford J. L. Stud. 637, 638-
642 (1999); Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law, ch. 14, Introduction to German Law, p. 396 
(2nd ed., M. Reimann & J. Zekoll, eds. 2005).   It is unclear whether German law requires an 
actor’s beliefs about the elements of self-defense to be both honest and reasonable.  
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serious enough threat has been posed, and if one honestly and reasonably believes 
that the use of the force in self-defense is necessary to prevent that threat.  Though 
jurisdictions differ in how they specify these elements of proportionality and 
necessity,3 almost all endorse this basic structure. 
 But one underappreciated problem with the standard account is that it is 
excessively cognitive.  In the suddenness of an attack, a private person might simply 
react, and might not actually form all the supposedly requisite beliefs about the 
extent of the threat, the expected  seriousness of his violent respond, and the 
availability of alternatives to using deadly force.  Sometimes, I will argue, such a 
reaction is still justifiable, despite the absence of an honest belief in the facts that 
support the justification.  And yet, the law cannot simply permit self-defense so long 
as the defendant genuinely reacted to a threat; some type of normative standard 
must serve as a limit, at least when we are proposing to give defendant a full 
defense. 
 Consider some examples.  In Valentine v. Commonwealth,4 the defendant 
was cutting flowers in her garden when she was suddenly struck from behind by a 
larger and stronger woman.  After initially attempting to ward off the blows, without 
success, the defendant struck back with her clenched fists “by raising her closed 
hands and striking downward in a similar manner as she was being struck.”5  But she 
forgot that she held in her hand an open knife, and her blows caused the assailant’s 
death.  Her use of deadly force was found to be permissible.  On the conventional 
account of self-defense, she should not be entitled to a full defense unless she 
honestly and reasonably believed (among other things) either that the attacker was 
threatening deadly force, or, if she believed that the attacker was threatening 
nondeadly force, that her own response would only be likely to cause nondeadly 
                                                                                                                                                 
Schumann, id.  According to Fletcher, “[t]he German code contains no legislated solution to 
the problem.”  George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law 159 (1998). 
 French criminal law requires honest and reasonable beliefs that the relevant facts 
exist.  However, the required elements of necessity and proportionality are not further 
specified in the governing legislation.   Catherine Elliott, French Criminal Law 109-112 (2001). 
3 Jurisdictions typically permit deadly force when the defendant is faced with a threat of 
death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or rape, but differ about whether other nondeadly 
threats (such as robbery, burglary, or other intrusions into a home) suffice.  See Joshua 
Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 283-287 (4th ed. 2006); Wayne LaFave, Criminal Law 
541, 555 (4th ed. 2003).  And jurisdictions differ about the requisite imminence of the threat 
and differ considerably about the existence and scope of a duty to retreat before employing 
deadly force.  Dressler, id. at 243-248; LaFave, id. at 544-546, 547-549. 
4 48 S.E.2d 264 (Va. 1948). 
5 Id. at 266. 
Page 4 of 38 Simons, RPP and self def. 1/10/08 
harm.  And yet it is quite possible that she did not reasonably believe that her 
response would be nondeadly (if the jury concludes that she should have 
remembered the knife in her hand).  Even more fundamentally, it is also quite 
possible that she held no beliefs at all at that time about the seriousness of the harm 
that she was likely to inflict.  She might simply have been shielding herself, or striking 
back in the only way that she could think of at the moment.  Should we really 
preclude a self-defense claim merely because she lacked any belief about the 
degree of force she was about to inflict?6 
 In People v. Aponte,7 the victim, who had joined another in robbing the 
defendant at gunpoint earlier the same day, again approached defendant, who was 
now seated in his car.  Defendant pointed his gun at the victim, who ran away, but 
then spun around and pulled out his gun.  Defendant promptly fired a shot that killed 
the victim.  At trial, the prosecution pressed defendant on why he did not choose an 
alternative, less dangerous response: 
In response to questioning, he stated that at the time the engine of his 
automobile was still running and that it was in neutral. He was asked whether 
there was anything stopping him from driving away at that time and he 
answered "No." He guessed that he could have driven away but stated: "I 
wasn't thinking, I didn't know what I was thinking about when his friend ran 
towards the back of the car. I figured maybe he was coming on the other side 
because they were very, very bold. There was so much in my mind. I was 
confused. I wasn't really thinking at that time. I really wasn't aware. I didn't 
even know that the car was on. I was intent on the situation. I didn't want to 
get shot. It happened so fast. I didn't think I really had an opportunity to drive 
away * * * I didn't plan it. I didn't plan on firing, it just happened."8 
 
The court described the evidence as “closely balanced (as to reasonable doubt 
about self-defense).”9  Yet defendant’s statements for the most part suggest that he 
lacked some of the affirmative beliefs that the law requires—beliefs that his conduct 
                                                 
6 Interestingly enough, in the actual case, the court dismissed the prosecution, not on the 
ground of justifiable self-defense, but on the ground that the homicide was “excusable 
homicide inflicted through misadventure in the lawful repulse of an unjustified attack.”  Id. at 
267.  The court declined to rely on self-defense because objectively there was no threat of 
deadly harm, and because the defendant lacked a purpose to take life or inflict serious bodily 
harm.  This reasoning is unconventional and surprising.  A purpose to defend oneself even 
from a threat of nondeadly force ordinarily counts as self-defense. 
7 69 A.D.2d 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). 
8 Id. at 209. 
9 Id. at 221. 
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was necessary and that he had no alternative but to use deadly force immediately.10  
Again, however, is it realistic, is it fair, to require such a defendant to have affirmative 
beliefs in order to obtain a full defense?11 
 My proposed solution, more fully articulated below, is to require that 
defendant exercise a reasonable degree of self-control in response to the threat, but 
not require that defendant actually form all of the specific beliefs that a jurisdiction’s 
self-defense doctrine formally requires of beliefs—for example, the beliefs that he 
was threatened with deadly, imminent force, that the force he expected to inflict 
would itself be deadly, and that he had no alternative means of protecting himself.  
This test of “reasonable degree of self-control” would take into account both the 
power of fear and anger to induce instinctive defensive reactions, and our legitimate 
social expectation that the actor respond to and express such emotions with 
appropriate restraint and sound judgment. 
 Let me begin with a clarification.  In order to validly assert self-defense, the 
actor must, I assume, at least (1) believe that he is imminently threatened with some 
degree of violence, and (2) react with force for the purpose of defending himself.12  
But what else should we realistically require him to believe? 
                                                 
10 To be sure, the statement “I didn't think I really had an opportunity to drive away” could 
express either an affirmative exculpatory belief (“I consciously considered the matter and 
decided I had no realistic opportunity to drive away”) or the absence of an inculpatory belief 
(“I didn’t think about the question of an opportunity to drive away; so I didn’t have the positive 
belief that I could drive away.”). 
11 See also Blackhurst v. State, 721 P.2d 645, 648 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986), reasoning that a 
defendant’s admissions that, when he shot the victim, “he ‘panicked,’ ‘was in shock,’ ‘wasn't 
thinking, and might have had the opportunity to retreat by jumping overboard” all “tended to 
disprove” his claim of self-defense. 
12 Thus, I am not suggesting that a defendant is justified in employing self-defense 
when his conduct is a pure reflex reaction characterized by no thought or 
intentionality at all. 
 Moreover, in order for the issue of a defense even to arise, the actor must have 
satisfied the mental state requirements for the crime of which he would, absent a defense, be 
guilty (such as murder or assault).  In the case of murder, the actor typically must have acted 
with purpose to kill, knowledge that he will kill, or extreme recklessness or a depraved heart.  
All of these states of mind (with the possible exception of common law depraved heart) 
require at least some consciousness of the risk that his acts will kill. 
 What if D’s use of force is (objectively, i.e. in view of the actual external facts) justified 
but D is not aware of any of the justifying facts?  (Unknown to D, V is posing a threat of 
harm.)   Scholars differ on whether unknowing justification should lead to full liability or to a 
reduction to attempt liability (or sometimes to no liability at all).  For a recent discussion of the 
debate, see R.A. Duff, Rethinking Justifications, 39 Tulsa Law Rev. 829, 842-850 (2004).  But 
this debate is orthogonal to the issues I am discussing here, since I do assume that the D is 
motivated by a defensive purpose, and I then explore whether D should be entitled to a 
defense if he is unaware of or lacks a belief about some of the justifying facts. 
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 Taken literally, existing American legal standards fail to provide a full defense 
to individuals who form no belief13 about the severity of a threat, about the severity of 
the force they expect to inflict in response, or about the available alternatives to 
employing force, even if their actual conduct conforms to legal requirements of 
reasonableness.  I strongly suspect that the law actually applied in the jury room 
(and in lawyers’ offices when plea deals are worked out) is not so harsh.  But it is 
anomalous that the legal standard demands a standard of consciousness and 
lucidity that is so unrealistic.  Can we do better? 
 This issue is situated within two broader debates in criminal law doctrine and 
theory.  The first debate concerns whether justifications (such as self-defense, 
defense of others, or choice of lesser evils) should be understood as imposing 
“subjective” requirements, “objective” requirements, or both.14  My view, elaborated 
below, is that a valid self-defense claim requires:  
                                                                                                                                                 
 What if D is aware of the justifying facts but does not act for the purpose of defending 
himself?  (D sees that V is a threat; he would ordinarily permit the minor assault without 
defending himself; but on this occasion, he takes the opportunity to violently push V away 
only because of personal dislike for V.)  Such cases are few, and the law is unclear. =[check]  
The issue is not significant to this paper: if indeed such a D should be justified, then I would 
replace the minimal requirement “must act for the purpose of self-defense” with something 
like, “must act with the belief that he is facing a serious threat of violence if he does not 
respond with force.” 
13 I deliberately use the term “no belief” rather than the more familiar terms, “mistake” and 
“ignorance.” 
 “Mistake” is inapt here because it refers to an actor’s actual belief that is contrary to 
fact, whereas I am addressing the situation in which the actor lacks a belief either that certain 
facts exist that would justify him, or that certain facts exist that would not justify him.  I take it 
for granted that the actor is entitled to a full defense of self-defense if he possesses all the 
requisite honest and reasonable affirmative beliefs that, if true, would justify him (a belief that 
deadly force is threatened, that deadly force is immediately necessary, and so forth). 
 “Ignorance” is also not quite the right term to use here, though it is more difficult to 
explain why.  Suppose defendant is suddenly attacked and does not realize that he is being 
attacked with nondeadly rather than deadly force, or does not realize that he could safely 
retreat.  In a sense he is “ignorant” of these facts.  But suppose (as in my hypothesized 
scenarios) he has not even adverted to the possibility of these facts being true.  Then I think it 
is more natural to say that he has “no belief” about these facts, not that he was “ignorant” of 
them.  By contrast, if someone asks me to name the U.S. Congressman from Idaho, I would 
claim ignorance: I am adverting to the factual question but am unable to answer it with any 
level of belief.  Perhaps one reason for a reluctance to employ “ignorance” in my scenarios is 
that the actor’s failure to advert to the facts in question is perfectly understandable, given the 
sudden attack; and “ignorant” often carries a pejorative connotation.  (But not always.  We 
would naturally describe an unconscious patient under anesthesia as “ignorant” of an 
unplanned procedure that the doctors perform while she is unconscious.).  In any case, the 
choice of terminology here is a linguistic question, and not of substantive importance. 
14 For some recent discussions, see Duff, supra note 12=; Kimberly Ferzan, Justifying 
Self-Defense, 24 Law and Philosophy 711 (2005). 
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 (a) A justificatory intent (i.e., the actor must indeed act for the purpose 
of self-defense);  
 (b) Either (1) reasonable beliefs in the legally relevant external facts or 
(2) reasonable self-control in light of those external facts (where it is 
justifiable that the actor lacks beliefs in some of these facts).  This is a 
normative, “objective” requirement, operating as a limit on the actor’s beliefs 
and conduct.  Here, the term “objective” underscores that the actor’s 
subjective, honest beliefs and his subjective good intention to defend himself 
are not sufficient to warrant a defense.  These normative limits serve as ex 
ante guides to action, and thus are better classified as aspects of justification 
than as aspects of excuse. 
 The “external facts” relevant here are facts indicating conformity with 
specified “objective” or external requirements of necessity and proportionality 
(where “objectivity” refers to the ex post justifiability of the conduct).  For 
example, if the actor uses deadly force against a threat that the law deems 
insufficient to permit that response,15 then in this “objective” sense, the actor’s 
response is disproportionate.  It is unfortunate that the same language, 
“objective,” is employed sometimes to describe a requirement of reasonable 
beliefs (rather than subjective beliefs) and sometimes to describe the very 
different idea that the actual state of the world is such that, after the event, we 
can say that the actor used necessary and proportionate force. 
 Because a person obtains a full defense if he acts with reasonable 
beliefs or reasonable self-control, an actor’s actual conformity with the legal 
necessity and proportionality requirements of the defense is not required.  In 
the case of beliefs, this is the doctrine of reasonable mistake; in the case of 
self-control, no analogous term exists.16 
  
 The second debate is about the meaning and significance of reasonable 
person criteria in the criminal law.  A reasonable person test is often employed in 
criminal law doctrine as a criterion of cognitive fault:  Did the defendant unreasonably 
                                                 
15 For example, suppose, after the fact, it is clear that the assailant was only threatening 
to shove the actor. 
16 “Reasonable ignorance” might appear to be the analogous term, but it is not.  See note 
13=, supra, and TAN 54= infra. 
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fail to appreciate a risk of harm, or unreasonably fail to recognize a legally relevant 
circumstance element (such as the nonconsent of the victim)?  But it is sometimes 
applied more directly as a norm of permissible conduct: Did the defendant depart 
sufficiently from a standard of reasonable care, e.g. in operating a motor vehicle, that 
he deserves punishment?  A third type of criterion, which has received much less 
attention, asks what degree of control a reasonable person would have exercised. 
Did the defendant fail to act with the degree of self-control that can fairly be 
expected?  Many criminal acts occur in highly emotional, stressful, or emergency 
situations, situations in which it is often both unrealistic and unfair to expect the actor 
to formulate beliefs about all of the facts relevant to the legality or justifiability of his 
conduct.  A “reasonable degree of self-control” criterion is sometimes better than the 
first, “cognitive fault” criterion insofar as it embraces these contextual factors in 
judging the actor’s culpability.  At the same time, this type of criterion is also 
sometimes used as a criterion of excuse rather than justification (as in the doctrine of 
duress), and indeed as a criterion of partial rather than complete defense (as in the 
doctrine of provocation), so care is needed in articulating the meaning and 
significance of the criterion in different criminal law contexts. 
 The discussion proceeds in three parts.  First, I review three possible 
alternative solutions to the “absence of belief” problem.  These other approaches 
turn out to be inadequate.  Next, I offer a solution, demonstrate its compatibility with 
recent psychological and neuroscientific research, and address some doctrinal 
wrinkles.  Third, I respond to six possible objections to this solution. 
 
II.   Possible solutions 
 
 Here are three possible solutions to the problem.  Each initially appears 
promising but turns out to be unsatisfactory.17 
                                                 
17 A fourth possible solution is to emphasize the criminal law requirement that the defendant 
commit a voluntary act, and to argue that in “no belief” cases, the defendant does not make a 
sufficiently considered, deliberate choice to satisfy that requirement.  But the argument is 
weak.  The voluntariness requirement is not nearly so stringent: habitual and impulsive 
actions easily satisfy it.  And here, by hypothesis, the defendant has indeed consciously 
chosen to engage in defensive action.  Cf. People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1970) (the 
court requires a voluntary act instruction in a case where defendant’s conduct might be 
interpreted as an act of self-defense, but it so requires only because defendant provided 
credible evidence that he was unconscious when he fired the deadly shot).  To be sure, if 
neuroscience evidence demonstrates that the effect of the violent threat on the defendant 
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 A. Rely on an expanded interpretation of belief that encompasses tacit or 
latent beliefs 
 
 “Belief” is often a legal requirement in the criminal law, both in offense and 
defense definitions.  But perhaps the requirement need not entail that the actor 
holding the relevant belief is consciously preoccupied with it.  Perhaps it is enough 
that the belief is immediately accessible, and can play a role in the actor’s practical 
reasoning.  For example, suppose one element of aggravated bank robber is 
“knowingly carrying a loaded gun.”  We might properly say that a bank robber, having 
loaded the gun earlier in the day, “believes” that it is loaded when he pulls it out and 
points it at the bank teller, even though he gives no conscious thought, at that 
moment, to whether it is loaded or not.  One way to spell this out is as follows: if 
asked at that moment whether he believed the gun was loaded, a truthful bank 
robber would say “yes, of course.”18 
 In my view, when the law imposes legal requirements of belief, it does (and 
should) embrace tacit or latent belief to some extent.19  But we must be cautious 
here.  How far can we justifiably expand the concept of belief beyond an actor’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
was genuinely to make it physically impossible for him to act otherwise than he did, a 
voluntary act defense would be plausible.  But the current state of the scientific evidence 
hardly suggests that defendants subjected to threats are so compelled by the threat that their 
acts are “involuntary” in the strong sense that criminal law doctrine requires; these acts are 
not comparable to the acts of those who are physically coerced by another or even the acts 
of those who are hypnotized.  See Michael Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1091 (1985. 
18 For some useful discussions of subconscious, tacit, and latent beliefs, see Stephen Shute, 
Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law, in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the General 
Part (S. Shute & A.P. Simester eds. 2002); G. R. Sullivan, Knowledge, Belief, and Culpability, 
in id., pp. 210-212; Kimberly Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 597, 
627-645 (2001); R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability 159-165 (1990).  See also 
Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 
Ohio State J. Crim. L. 179, 192-193 (2003). 
19 One complication here is that jurisdictions following the Model Penal Code’s definition of 
recklessness as “conscious” disregard of a risk must adopt a narrower conception of both 
recklessness and knowledge, a conception that has much less room for latent beliefs.  For 
“consciousness” of a risk or fact must mean that the actor either is preoccupied in his thought 
with the risk or fact, or at least has some level of specific contemporary awareness of it.  And 
because recklessness requires consciousness, “knowledge” or “belief” in a fact must require 
consciousness as well.  For the Code’s hierarchy of mental states treats knowledge as a 
more culpable state of mind than recklessness; it would therefore make no sense to impose 
on the state a more stringent proof requirement (i.e., to require the state to prove 
consciousness) only for the less culpable state of mind, recklessness, and not for the more 
culpable, knowledge. 
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consciously held thoughts and focused awareness?  The more expansive the 
interpretation, the greater the risk that our definition of subjective belief collapses into 
a broader, objective criterion, “should have believed (or realized).”  And such a 
collapse is inconsistent with the prevalent legislative intention in modern criminal 
statutes to distinguish subjective and objective criteria of culpability (and inconsistent 
with the underlying moral difference between the two types of criteria). 
 Consider a different example, involving a second bank robber.  Suppose it 
would have been obvious to almost anyone in this bank robber’s position that the 
gun was loaded, because his confederate just handed it to him and he knows that his 
confederate normally carries only loaded guns.  It does not logically follow that the 
robber actually believed that it was loaded.  (Of course, if he did fail to form that 
belief, his failure to do so is most likely negligent.)  A legislative distinction between 
subjective awareness of x (belief that x is possible, or probable, or highly probable), 
on one hand, and negligent failure to be aware of x, on the other, is supposed to limit 
the former to an extra, and narrower, form of culpability.  A typical rationale for the 
distinction is that only when the actor is subjectively aware of the legally relevant 
features of his conduct is he culpable in a special way for deliberately choosing to do 
wrong. 
 How does this analysis apply to the beliefs (and lack of beliefs) of actors 
suddenly confronted with the need to use force in self-defense?  Some such actors 
have “preoccupying” beliefs about the relevant facts (such as the severity of the 
threat, the likely severity of the response, and the availability of the alternatives).  
They might literally think to themselves: “He might kill me!  I’d better use my knife, 
and stick it in his chest right now, even though this might kill him.  If I don’t do this 
right away, if I try anything else, I’m done for.”  Other actors in this situation might 
have latent or tacit beliefs.  If asked, and if they replied truthfully, they would give 
essentially the same account, but those thoughts were not uppermost in their minds 
at the time they acted; indeed, the thoughts might not have been in their minds, 
might not have surfaced at some level of consciousness, at all.  But actors in a third 
category, I submit, do not satisfy even the requirement of latent beliefs.  If asked, 
they would truthfully say, “I wasn’t thinking about how likely it was he would kill me, I 
simply felt terribly threatened.”  Or, even more likely: “I didn’t really think about how 
likely it was that my stabbing him would kill him.  I just wanted him to stop attacking 
and that is all I could think of doing at the time.”  And: “I didn’t look around to see 
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what alternatives I had.  I felt trapped, so I reacted and lashed out at him.”  Yet in 
some instances within this third category, the actor nevertheless acts justifiably (as I 
will explain further below). 
 Accordingly, although a recognition that legal belief requirements can 
encompass latent beliefs expands the category of belief somewhat, and perhaps 
significantly, beyond preoccupying beliefs, I do not think that this expansion suffices 
to address the self-defense problem I focus on in this paper.20 
 
 B.   Treat the “lack of belief” scenario as one of excuse, not justification 
 
 Perhaps the problem should not be treated as a matter of justification at all.  
Perhaps, in other words, I have described a situation in which a person, suddenly 
threatened, understandably has a tendency to panic, or to act without thinking 
clearly, and perhaps this warrants a full defense—but on the grounds, not of 
justification, but of excuse.  Arguably it is too much to expect a person to think 
clearly, and to act properly and permissibly, in such emergency circumstances.  
Compare duress, a true excuse at least in its Model Penal Code version: an actor 
who is coerced by a violent threat into committing a criminal act is fully excused if “a 
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.”21  
Perhaps in the self-defense scenarios we are considering, too, a reasonable person 
in the actor’s situation would have been unable to think clearly and rationally about 
the propriety of his response and the available alternatives.22 
                                                 
20 However, it is worth noting that the rationale for not unduly expanding latent or tacit 
knowledge when we are interpreting the scope of “belief” or “knowledge” as to an offense 
element (specifically, the need to distinguish between “did know” and “should have known”) is 
not the same as the rationale for not unduly expanding latent or tacit knowledge when we are 
interpreting “belief” as to the element of a defense.  In the latter case, if there is a sufficient 
policy reason for limiting defenses to actors who possess actual knowledge of or belief in 
certain facts supporting the defense, then the reluctance to read “belief” expansively 
obviously has the effect of excluding a defense and thus imposing, rather than excluding, 
criminal liability.  So it is at least conceivable that the law should take a more expansive view 
of “belief” in the context of defenses.  Just how expansive this interpretation should be 
depends on how rigorous our expectation is that the actor invoking a defense must act for all 
the right reasons and with all the right (exculpatory) beliefs. 
21 Model Penal Code §2.09 (1). 
22 See, e.g., R. A. Duff, Rule-Violations and Wrongdoings, in Shute & Simester, supra note 
18=, at 64 (describing a case in which a tortured defendant reveals secret information); 
Jeremy Horder, Excusing Crime 48-52  (2004).  Another rationale for duress as an excuse is 
that an actor whose own life or welfare is at stake might (even if not panicky or thinking 
irrationally) understandably though unjustifiably overvalue his own welfare, relative to thhe 
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 I agree with this response to some extent.  Some cases in which defendants 
are entitled to acquittal on grounds of self-defense—and more cases than you might 
think—indeed can only be explained (if at all) as a matter of excuse, not 
justification.23  But I don’t think this response suffices to cover all of the cases we are 
examining here.  Insofar as the distinction between justification and excuse is morally 
and legally legitimate, and I think it is, many cases of “no belief” defensive force 
ought to be classified as justified, not excused.  In many such cases, we would not 
really expect a law-abiding, permissibly motivated defendant to form an accurate 
belief about the severity of the threat or, especially, about the range and efficacy of 
different alternative courses of response.  And in many such cases, we could not 
expect any law-abiding, properly motivated defendant to do better, to act differently 
than the actual defendant did.24  Indeed, it will often be a self-defeating strategy for 
                                                                                                                                                 
interess of other victims or of the community.  This excusatory rationale, too, sometimes 
applies in the context of self-defense. 
23 See Model Penal Code Commentaries, Article 3, Introduction, cmt at 3-4 (1985): 
 
For many cases of self-defense it would probably be generally agreed that the use of 
deadly force was actually desirable, but for others, e.g. resistance by one family 
member to attack by another, there would be disagreement whether the use of 
deadly force was actually desirable or should merely be accepted as a natural 
response to a grave threat. 
 
(I do take issue, however, with the assumption in this passage that the conduct in question 
must, in order to count as a justification be “desirable” as opposed to morally permissible.)  
See also Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Boundaries of Justification and Excuse, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 1897, 1904-1906 (1984); Heller, supra note 2=, 26 American Journal of 
Criminal Law at 28-30. 
 Consider the legal status of the duty to retreat.  American jurisdictions universally 
exclude the duty when the actor is using only nondeadly force, and either deny or narrowly 
restrict the duty even when the actor is using deadly force.  One plausible rationale for the 
policy is an excuse based on psychological realism: many or most citizens simply will not 
retreat in the face of threats of violence, and this reaction is understandable though not 
commendable or socially acceptable.  See Greenawalt, id. at 1906. 
 Moreover, in many self-defense cases resulting in death, the deceased has provoked 
the defendant by his initial assault, and that provocation is often legally sufficient to warrant a 
mitigating instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  However, I am focusing on when a 
defendant who is suddenly attacked is entitled to a full, rather than partial, defense. 
24 German criminal law includes a provision that somewhat resembles my proposal.  See §33 
of the Penal Code, “Excessive Self-Defense” (“If the perpetrator exceeds the limits of 
necessary self-defense due to confusion, fear or fright, then he shall not be punished.”) 
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] 1987, as amended Dec. 19, 2001, translated in 32 American 
Series of Foreign Penal Codes: German Penal Code 12, §33 (Stephen Thaman trans., 2002). 
 This provision seems to reflect an excuse perspective, though it also might reflect a 
justification perspective, insofar as a properly motivated actor using sound judgment might 
nonetheless, in the confusion and suddenness of an attack, fail to form the beliefs about the 
facts supporting self-defense that the law normally requires.  However, on its face the 
German provision is extraordinarily broad, allowing the defense whenever the (objectively 
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an actor who is suddenly attacked to pause and carefully examine his options; the 
very effort to form accurate, or indeed any, beliefs might increase his risk of injury or 
decrease the efficacy of his planned response.  More subtly, an actor unused to 
employing violence might rationally decide (perhaps after taking a self-defense 
course) not to permit herself to think about the consequences of her defensive 
actions, plausibly concluding that if she were to contemplate the pain or the specific 
injuries she might cause to the assailant, her anxiety and misgivings about these 
effects might disable her from using sufficient force to defend herself.25  Thus, in 
many cases, an actor who does not form the full set of beliefs that the law purports to 
require is acting justifiably: he is acting as he should, or at least in a tolerable or 
permissible manner.  His reaction is thus unlike that of a person who takes 
advantage of an excuse like duress; it is not best described as an unfortunate, 
regrettable, but understandable and largely blameless human response. 
 To be sure, there is a significant debate in the criminal law literature about 
whether the analogous issue of “reasonable mistake” is better analyzed as an 
instance of justification or of excuse.26  If an actor reasonably believes that the threat 
is of deadly force, or reasonably believes that he has no alternative but to use force 
immediately, yet is mistaken about these issues of proportionality or necessity, it is 
widely agreed  that he nevertheless should a full defense; but people disagree about 
whether justification or excuse explains why he should not be punished.  I come 
down on the “justification” side of this dispute.  Or perhaps we need a third category, 
of “justification*” rather than simply “justification,” to account for (justified*) 
reasonable mistakes and to differentiate them from (justified) reasonable beliefs that 
are true.27  Whatever label we attach here, it is important to remember that a 
reasonable mistake is a belief that it is not blameworthy or culpable to have; indeed, 
often it is a belief that we want to encourage actors to form, since it will ordinarily 
                                                                                                                                                 
unjustifiable) response is due to the subjective confusion or fear of the defendant.  My 
proposal is much narrower, allowing the defense only when the actor’s confused or fearful 
response is also consistent with reasonable self-control. 
25 I thank Marcia Baron for suggesting this last point.  Note, however, that the actor in this last 
situation sometimes will at least have a latent belief that she will harm the other.  See TAN 18-
20= supra. 
26 Compare Kent Greenawalt, supra note 23=, at 1907-1909 (justification), with Fletcher, 
Rethinking Criminal Law 691-698 (1978) (excuse).  For a citation to some of the literature, 
see Duff, supra note 12=, at 838, n. 27. 
27 See Duff, Rethinking Justifications, supra note 12=, at 841-842, distinguishing “warranted” from 
“justified” acts, and defining “warranted” similarly to my definition of “justified.*” 
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lead to conduct that is objectively desirable (or at least permissible) in the ex post, 
external sense.28  Criminal law norms of reasonable belief are action-guiding: they 
provide ex ante standards of ideal behavior for real-world actors who must make 
decisions without any guarantee that their prudent assessment of the facts will be 
correct.  Thus, I believe that actors who make reasonable mistakes are better 
understood as justified than as excused.29  And that explains why I also conclude 
that the “no belief” actor who has exercised reasonable self-control should similarly 
be treated as justified, not as excused.30  He, too, has acted as he should have 
acted, from an ex ante perspective.  He, too, has followed a rule (“exercise 
reasonable self-control”) that guides action. 
 
                                                 
28 See Greenawalt, supra note 25=, at 1907-1909.  See also Hamish Stewart, The Role of 
Reasonableness in Self-Defence, 16 Can. J. L. & Juris. 317 (2003). 
29 See Shelly Kagan, Normative Ethics 66 (1998). 
 To be sure, the action-guiding characteristic of reasonable mistakes is less obvious, 
and indeed more often inapplicable, when the mistake pertains to an element of an offense 
rather than to a defense.  If an actor reasonably believes that a firing range target is a 
manikin when it is actually a human being, and therefore accidentally kills the person, 
perhaps we should not say that it is actually positively desirable, ex ante, that people act 
upon similar appearances in the future.  Here, reasonable mistake might be a norm of 
permissible rather than desirable behavior (ex ante), or even a matter of excuse, and thus not 
action-guiding in the strong sense suggested in the text.  (I thank Peter Westen for the 
example and for pointing out this objection.)  Similarly, there might be few reasonable 
mistakes as to nonconsent in rape that we want to encourage, as opposed to permit or 
excuse. 
 Still, I believe that there are many reasonable mistakes, both as to defenses and as 
to offense elements, that we do want to encourage—for example, the policy of having police 
officers arrest based on reasonable appearances, or the policy of a liquor store owner to 
require two photo IDs to ensure that the buyer is above age.  It is sometimes better, indeed 
much better, to engage in an activity or act with a known small risk of harm (that cannot 
realistically be lowered without incurring significant burdens or costs) than to avoid the 
activity.  Of course, reasonable mistakes about justifications (such as self-defense) are 
especially likely to be ex ante desirable, because by definition the actor has a compelling (ex 
ante) reason or “justification” for acting, based on reasonable appearances, to further the 
interests protected by the justification defense. 
30 In this paper, I do not pursue the question whether the justification of self-defense is 
ultimately rooted in a deontological rationale, a consequentialist rationale, or some 
combination of the two.  Whatever the underlying rationale, I believe that many “no belief” 
cases warrant a full defense if “honest and reasonable belief” cases do.  But the precise 
contours of my “no belief” proposal would indeed depend on the rationale.  For example, if an 
incentive-focused consequentialist endorses a privilege of self-defense only insofar as the 
primary norm against killing can have absolutely no deterrent effect, he might adopt a 
narrower version of the proposal than a retributivist who believes that forming and acting 
upon accurate beliefs in these stressful and constrained situations is extremely difficult but 
not impossible. 
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 C.   Rely on the distinction between beliefs and actions 
 
 This distinction, articulated by Cynthia Lee, helpfully focuses attention on the 
inadequacy of a merely cognitive articulation of self-defense requirements.  Lee 
points out that legal doctrine and jury instructions sometimes are not as explicit as 
they should be in requiring that the defendant’s conduct, and not merely his emotions 
and beliefs, satisfy legal standards of self-defense.  It is not enough that the actor 
possess the emotion of fear, or the belief that he is about to be attacked; he must 
also act reasonably in using only proportional force in response, and in not inflicting 
force when safer alternatives exist.31 
 Lee’s approach, by expanding the law’s focus beyond beliefs, might appear 
helpful in resolving the problem posed in this paper.  However, her analysis still 
assumes that honest and reasonable beliefs are necessary to the successful 
assertion of self-defense.  I am questioning that assumption in a certain category of 
cases. 
 Moreover, although Lee’s emphasis on the legal requirement that acts as well 
as beliefs (or emotions) be reasonable is valuable, it is also potentially misleading.  
Ordinarily, “objective” (in the sense of external) self-defense proportionality and 
necessity requirements—that is, requirements other than belief requirements—are 
not articulated simply as requirements that the force be “reasonably” proportionate or 
“reasonably” necessary.  Rather, the (typically legislative) articulation of 
proportionality and necessity is usually in the form of a rule, not a (“reasonableness”) 
standard—for example, the defendant may only use deadly force if faced with deadly 
force, rape, or kidnapping; or may only use force if the threat is imminent (on one 
version) or immediately necessary (on another); or must retreat in circumstances X 
but not Y (or alternatively, is never required to retreat).32 
 Furthermore, the actual cases that she cites as proof of a need for an 
independent reasonable act requirement seem instead to be examples where the 
law should more explicitly require honest and reasonable beliefs, not about the 
existence of a threat, but about necessity and proportionality.  That is, she aptly 
                                                 
31 See Cynthia Lee, Murder and The Reasonable Person: Passion and Fear in the Criminal 
Courtroom (2003), ch. 10 (“The Act-Emotion Distinction”).  See also Cynthia Lee, The Act-
Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual Requirement Theory of Justification, 
2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 191 (1998). 
32 See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§3.04-3.09. 
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criticizes the courts’ overemphasis on honest and reasonable beliefs that one is 
being threatened, and their neglect of the questions whether the actor should have 
used lesser force, or should have avoided the use of force altogether, in response.  
But those neglected questions could, under the traditional model, be answered by 
requiring the actor to honestly and reasonably believe that (a) the degree of force he 
is using in response is not disproportionate (e.g., he reasonably believes that he will 
only inflict nondeadly harm in response to a threat that the jurisdiction would consider 
nondeadly); and (b) the response is necessary to protect himself (e.g., he reasonably 
believes the threat is imminent in a jurisdiction articulating “necessity” in that manner, 
and he reasonably believes that no nonviolent alternatives are available by which he 
could protect his safety). 
 In short, it is not clear what a reasonable act requirement adds to the 
traditional requirement that the actor honestly and reasonably believe a specified set 
of facts that are, as a matter of law, legally sufficient to provide a defense.  Indeed 
the addition of an independent act requirement seems in tension with the well-
accepted doctrine that a person who makes a reasonable mistake about one of the 
required elements of self-defense is still entitled to a full defense. 
 To be sure, an act requirement of a modest sort is indeed implicit in self-
defense tests—namely, the requirement that the actor’s forceful response be in 
conformity with his honest and reasonable beliefs.  Imagine that I honestly and 
reasonably believe that I am threatened with nondeadly force, that my forceful 
response is necessary, and that it will cause only nondeadly harm.  Now suppose 
that my use of force causes the death of the aggressor.  How could this happen?  
First, perhaps I tried to use nondeadly force but accidently caused more harm than I 
reasonably expected.  This is a case of reasonable mistake; I did act in conformity 
with my beliefs, and should receive a full defense.  Second, perhaps I got carried 
away and just chose to kill him.  In this case, of course, although my initial beliefs 
were honest and reasonable, my final decision to kill was not in conformity with those 
beliefs, so they cannot provide a defense. 
 Lee’s analysis is helpful in reminding us that this last, implicit act requirement 
is indeed scanted in most formulations of self-defense doctrine.  It essentially 
amounts to a concurrence requirement: just as “knowingly causing harm” is a 
legitimate category of murder only if the actor knows, before (and not merely after) 
he acts, that his act will cause harm, in the same way the “honest and reasonable 
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belief” requirements of criminal law defenses make sense only insofar as the actor 
incorporates these beliefs into his conduct.33 
 
 
III. A proposed standard for cases in which the defender has no belief as to 
some legally required facts 
 
 A. In general 
 
 Here is a proposed legal standard to encompass this special category of “no 
belief” cases, i.e., cases in which the defender has no belief as to some legally 
required facts: 
 If the actor honestly and reasonably believes that [the appropriate facts 
supporting self-defense] exist, and acts in conformity with such beliefs, he is entitled 
to a full defense of self-defense.  (The bracketed phrase is merely a stand-in for 
whatever precise legal self-defense requirements the jurisdiction in question 
imposes.) 
 But even if the actor has no beliefs about many of the relevant issues 
(imminence and severity of threat, severity of his own response, available 
alternatives), he should be entitled to a full defense of self-defense if his conduct 
conforms to that of a person in the circumstances exercising a reasonable degree of 
self-control.34   The actor need not honestly and reasonably believe all of the relevant 
facts that would, in law, provide a complete justification. 
 In determining whether the actor exercised reasonable self-control in 
response to an imminent threat, a jury may properly consider the power of fear, panic 
and anger, and their tendency to induce instinctive defensive reactions, but the jury 
should also keep in mind society’s legitimate expectation that all citizens who choose 
to use violent force should respond to and express such emotions with due restraint, 
                                                 
33 Cf. Kenneth Simons, Does Punishment for “Culpable Indifference” Simply Punish for “Bad 
Character”? Examining the Requisite Connection between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 Buff. 
Crim. L. Rev. 219, 247-257 (2002). 
34 Recall, however, the qualifications that the actor at least must believe that he is being 
threatened and must act for the purpose of self-defense.  See TAN 12= supra. 
 The “reasonable self-control” language might appear to be a version of the doctrine 
of provocation, which affords only a partial defense.  I address this concern below. See note 
59= supra. 
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caution and focus.  The jury should consider whether the defendant acted with good, 
sound judgment under the circumstances; the answer could be affirmative even if he 
did not form beliefs about all of the relevant facts.35  Although “reasonable self-
control” is a useful shorthand version of the test, “self-control” is not the only relevant 
question.  A jury should inquire whether the defendant acted reasonably in the 
circumstances, taking into account the exigencies of the situation,36 the emotions he 
justifiably felt, the beliefs he justifiably held, and the beliefs he justifiably lacked; and 
also taking into account the jurisdiction’s legal requirements for the permissible use 
of self-defense, including its criteria of proportionality (e.g., when can deadly force be 
used?) and necessity (e.g., what is the scope of any duty to retreat?).  This last 
consideration complicates the analysis, as we shall see below.  To be clear, my 
argument is not that “reasonable self-control” is itself the basic criterion or standard 
of justifiable self-defense, but, rather, that the “objective” or external requirements of 
necessity and proportionality should be supplemented either by “reasonable belief” 
requirements or by “reasonable self-control” requirements.37 
 The jury should also carefully consider the actor’s motives in reacting as he 
did.38  Indeed, motives must play an even more important role in these “no belief” 
                                                 
35 Compare this language from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, §70, comment b (“[T]he 
qualities which primarily characterize a reasonable man [for purposes of self-defense] are 
ordinary courage and firmness.”). 
 My emphasis on sound judgment is consistent with the virtue ethics approach to 
moral decision-making.  See Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (1999); Hursthouse, 
Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/ethics-
virtue/>.  But I propose it here as a standard that supplements, but does not replace, more 
cognitive and more rule-like criteria.  I hope thereby to minimize the force of the vagueness 
objection that I believe constitutes a legitimate reason not to employ exclusively virtue-based 
criteria in the law. 
36 Peter Westen has, in private communication, offered a vivid illustration of how even an 
unemotional, calm actor might justifiably or nonculpably fail to form some of the legally required 
beliefs.  If a former Army sniper receives word that three men are on their way to kill him, and if 
he coolly tracks the three as each successively approaches his house, he might reasonably be so 
focused on preventing the immediate threat of the first two that he reasonably fails to notice 
whether the third assailant is also posing an imminent threat.  This is a case in which focusing 
only on the terms “reasonable self-control” oversimplifies the considerations that explain why his 
ignorance is reasonable. 
37 In private conversation, Kim Ferzan has pointed out that one might view “reasonable self-
control” as the metastandard for the justification of self-defense, and then view proportionality and 
necessity rules as specifications of that standard.  But that is not the way in which my approach 
employs a criterion of reasonable self-control. 
38 For discussions of the importance of motive in the context of self-defense, see Ashworth, 
supra note 2=, at 147 (considering the “simple view” that self-defense doctrine should simply 
ask, “was the use of force an innocent and instinctive reaction, or was it the product of 
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cases than under traditional self-defense doctrine, because in these cases, we lack 
the usual justification structure, which requires that the actor possess honest and 
reasonable beliefs in the legally relevant facts comprising necessity and 
proportionality.  How should the jury evaluate the actor’s motives in “no belief” 
cases?  If his motives were pure, i.e., his exclusive intention in using force as he did 
was to protect himself from further harm, then we should adopt a strong presumption 
that he is justified.  But suppose instead, as is much more realistic, that his motives 
were mixed, and included illicit as well as legitimate reasons.  Thus, suppose one of 
his reasons for responding as he did was revenge, or a desire to cause the 
aggressor to suffer, or anger at being publicly humiliated.  We should not 
automatically exclude the defense in such cases.  After all, even in cases when the 
actor’s use of force is accompanied by his honest and reasonable beliefs in facts that 
justify him, his motives will often be mixed in this way.  At the same time, because 
we lack the discipline of the usual justification structure, we need to be cautious in 
allowing the defense here.  Perhaps it is sufficient that: (1) the actor’s conduct is no 
different from what we would expect of a (reasonable) person who was exclusively 
motivated by the need to protect himself; and (2) the actor was actually motivated in 
substantial part by such a need. 
 A further question about the proposed test is how it would address a 
recurrent problem in self-defense law—whether, and to what extent, the “reasonable” 
belief requirement should be individualized.  May the physical, ethnic, racial, cultural, 
age, sexual preference, or gender characteristics of the defendant properly be 
considered?  This is, of course, a topic of some difficulty and great controversy.39  I 
do not engage the topic here except to suggest that, in general, the extent of 
individualization that the law should endorse in determining whether the defendant 
                                                                                                                                                 
revenge or some manifest fault?”; Ashworth goes on to reject this view as too permissive and 
resting ultimately on excuse rather than justification); Paul Robinson, Criminal Law 469-475 
(1997). 
 For discussions of the importance of motives in assessing criminal culpability more 
generally, see Douglas Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 Crim. J. Ethics 3 (1984); 
Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
39 Peter Westen has recently provided a novel, intriguing analysis of how to analyze 
individualization.  He suggests that we: (a) take the defendant precisely as he is, with all of 
his physical, psychological, and emotional traits, and then “moralize” him, e.g., ask whether 
his inadvertence was culpable or excusable in light of the degree of his individual 
incapacities; rather than (b) (the usual approach) start with an abstract, idealized reasonable 
person and then selectively add some individual qualities of the defendant.  Peter Westen, 
Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, _ Crim. L. & Phil. _ (2008). 
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formed a “reasonable belief” or acted “reasonably” in light of his beliefs seems an 
appropriate measure of the extent of individualization that it should endorse in 
determining whether the defendant exercised a reasonable degree of self-control in 
responding to a sudden violent threat. 
 Finally, I turn to a difficult question about the scope of the test.  In the “no 
belief” scenario, must the actor’s defensive reaction still be “objectively” necessary 
and proportional (in the sense of conforming to the actual, external state of the 
world)?40  My test is most persuasive, of course, when the actor’s conduct does 
conform in this way, when his response is actually necessary and proportionate.   
But should he lose the defense if it turns out that the force he used was greater than 
necessary to prevent the attack, or that the aggressor was not planning any further 
attack, or that he could have safely retreated (in a jurisdiction requiring retreat)?  On 
first impression, there is no good reason to impose these additional requirements.  In 
the usual case when the actor has subjective beliefs about all the legally relevant 
factors, the actor can still get a defense even if his beliefs are mistaken and the 
objective, external facts don’t satisfy necessity and proportionality, so long as his 
beliefs are reasonable.  The same approach arguably should be taken here: even if 
the objective facts don’t satisfy necessity and proportionality, the actor should be 
entitled to a full defense if he exercised “reasonable” self-control as defined above. 
 However, there is a special complication here, a complication that requires us 
to analyze the “no belief” cases differently from cases of honest and reasonable 
beliefs that are mistaken.  Under traditional self-defense rules, the legislative 
specifications of proportionality and necessity settle, as a matter of law, what counts 
as reasonable force under the circumstances.  So if a defendant believes that 
robbery justifies deadly force, or that retreat is never required, or that the threat need 
not be imminent, when actually the jurisdiction provides otherwise, then defendant 
has made a mistake of law, one that ordinarily would not exculpate.  Indeed, neither 
mistake nor ignorance of such legal standards is ordinarily a defense.  Someone 
(say, Bernard) who forms a mistaken belief that he is entitled to use deadly force in 
response to nondeadly force (when he actually believes the threat is only of 
                                                 
40 It is not entirely clear how to specify all the elements of necessity and proportionality in 
terms of the “actual state of the world.”  After all, even the prediction that the aggressor would 
have continued the attack is an inevitably uncertain judgment made from a particular 
epistemic perspective.  See Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, supra note 14.  One might doubt 
whether this prediction is much different from asking what a reasonable person in the actor’s 
shoes would have predicted.   
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nondeadly force) would not get a defense; nor would someone (say, Carl) who forms 
a mistaken belief that retreat is not required (even though he actually believes, 
correctly, that it is in fact feasible).  Similarly, if Bernard and Carl had affirmative 
beliefs about the relevant facts but were simply ignorant of the legal standards, again 
they would have no defense.  So why should the result be different, why should they 
suddenly be entitled to a full defense, just because, instead of having beliefs about 
the relevant facts, they do not have such beliefs? 
 How, in other words, do the “objective” or external legislative self-defense 
criteria affect the permissible use of force under my proposal?  Here, by hypothesis, 
the actor has no beliefs at all about certain elements of proportionality or necessity.  
Somehow these elements need to be taken into account in applying my test, but 
how?  Should we allow a full defense to Arthur, who used deadly force against 
someone who (as he correctly perceived) was merely robbing him, not threatening 
deadly harm, even though the jurisdiction forbids deadly force in response to a 
robbery?  To Benjamin, who formed no belief about whether the force he planned to 
use would be deadly rather than nondeadly, and who actually used deadly force in 
reaction to a threat that only legally warranted a nondeadly response?  To Claudio, 
who did not retreat even though the jurisdiction requires it under the circumstances, 
and who formed no belief about the availability of retreat? 
 The proper analysis, I think, is as follows.  First, Arthur’s case is the least 
difficult.  Here, we can readily deny the defense, for even on my proposal, the actor 
needs to have some affirmative beliefs that warrant characterizing his reaction as a 
genuine case of self-defense.  So it is plausible to require him to believe that he is 
facing a type of threat that, under the law of the jurisdiction, permits a violent 
defensive response. 
 Second, the Benjamin and Claudio examples would also be easy if we 
imagine variations (°) in which the actors were “objectively” or externally justified 
(given the actual state of the world) rather than unjustified, as in the original 
examples.  If Benjamin° actually used nondeadly rather than deadly force, but 
formed no beliefs about the degree of force he was about to inflict, or if Claudio° had 
no chance to retreat, but again formed no beliefs about the matter, then (if their 
reactions otherwise satisfy my test) they should get a complete defense.  Affirmative 
beliefs in the justifying facts should not always be required.  And the very fact that 
Benjamin° and Claudio° were objectively justified is significant (though hardly 
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conclusive) evidence that they exercised reasonable self-control under the 
circumstances.  
 Third, in the actual Benjamin and Claudio examples, we cannot analyze 
“reasonable self-control” in isolation from the jurisdiction’s legal requirements.  And 
yet it is often unrealistic and unfair to expect such an actor both to be aware of those 
requirements and to incorporate them as constraints on his conduct, given the 
exigencies of the situation.  To some extent, then, a jurisdiction’s specified 
requirements will inevitably receive less weight than in traditional cases of 
reasonable mistake.  I believe this is an acceptable cost to pay for fairness to many 
“no belief” defendants, but it is indeed a cost, as we shall see. 
 Consider more closely the examples of Benjamin and Claudio.  Here, we 
cannot ignore entirely the jurisdiction’s specified proportionality and necessity 
criteria, which I am assuming the actor did not actually satisfy.  We do need to 
impose constraints in these cases against an unduly capacious self-defense 
privilege.  How should we give weight to these legislative criteria?  In principle, we 
should do so by asking: Did the actor show the same respect for the legislative rules 
that we can fairly expect of an actor who does have accurate beliefs about the 
relevant facts underlying his self-defense claim?  This question is admittedly difficult 
to answer.  For it rests either on a legal fiction that everyone knows the law (including 
the detailed contours of the law of self-defense), or at least on the moral falsehood 
that anyone who fails to know the law is blameworthy for that failure.  Moreover, this 
fiction and this falsehood are especially objectionable in the emergency 
circumstances of self-defense. 
 One way to make the question a bit more tractable is to focus on the “no 
belief” actor’s motivation.  Just as in traditional cases both a legally adequate motive 
and adequate beliefs are legally required, here an important constraint remains: at 
least an adequate motive is required.  If Benjamin and Claudio are properly 
motivated, if their reason for using force is really to defend themselves from future 
harm, then they will normally also have appropriate respect for the legal judgments of 
necessity and proportionality that the state has implemented.  But this analysis is far 
from conclusive; after all, jurisdictions can differ significantly in those legal 
judgments.  So we need to put the issue more concretely: is the “no belief” actor’s 
response consistent with what we would fairly expect of an actor who is fully aware 
of the jurisdiction’s legal requirements?  In other words, even if we accept the fiction 
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that all citizens do know the law or the falsehood that all should know it, we should 
ask whether someone in the extraordinary circumstances of a sudden attack who 
knew the legal standards and was generally motivated to comply with them would 
actually be able to form the necessary factual beliefs that would then permit him to 
find a less violent response, or to delay his response, or otherwise to act in objective 
or external conformity with the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  For 
example, suppose Benjamin knew that he was not legally entitled to use deadly force 
in response to a nondeadly threat of force.  The question for the jury is whether in 
actually using deadly force, but forming no belief about whether he was employing 
deadly rather than nondeadly force, he has acted with reasonable self-control and 
with appropriate respect for the legal norms.  And the answer could be yes, if he 
acted with a proper motivation, if he had little time and opportunity to perceive his 
environment and consciously contemplate an appropriate response, and if he acted 
with reasonable self-control. 
 Two additional constraints can limit the scope of the defense for “no belief” 
actors.  First, notice something special about the Claudio example.  Jurisdictions 
following the Model Penal Code’s approach to retreat resolve this example by 
providing a full defense unless Claudio actually forms the affirmative (and correct) 
belief that he can retreat safely.  So if Claudio forms no belief about the efficacy of 
retreat, one way or the other, he obtains a full defense.  This considerably narrows 
the duty to retreat, of course.  If we adopted similar requirements for all elements of 
self-defense, then my proposal would be otiose: an actor motivated by self-defense 
would lose the defense only if he affirmatively knew that his force was excessive in 
degree, or knew that the threat was nonimminent, or knew that he was using force 
against a lawful aggressor, and so forth.  There may be good reasons not to adopt 
such requirements generally, however.41  Still, it is important to keep in mind that 
even a selective use of such requirements can be helpful in significantly constraining 
the scope of the defense for “no belief” defendants. 
                                                 
41 A general requirement of this sort would, for example, give a defense (a) to an actor whose 
reason for ignorance of the relevant facts is culpable or (b) to an actor who failed to exercise 
reasonable self-control.  Here are examples of each scenario: (a) a gang member Max is 
paying insufficient attention to the imminence or non-imminence of an attack by a member of 
a rival gang because Max is focusing his attention on beating up another member of the rival 
gang; (b) a hot-headed person regularly responds to modest physical contact with extreme 
violence. 
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 Second, another potentially significant constraint on such a defense is this: 
actors cannot obtain a full defense if they hold affirmative beliefs that are directly 
inconsistent with the jurisdiction’s legal requirements.42  So if Claudio actually 
affirmatively believes that the aggressor will depart before inflicting any further 
violence, he should lose the defense.  (I discuss this second constraint below.43) 
 So, to answer the question posed a few paragraphs earlier, if Benjamin and 
Claudio obtain a full defense, they do not really receive unfair preference relative to 
Bernard and Carl (who will not), so long as their defense is based on a sound 
criterion of reasonable self-control, one that gives appropriate weight to the 
legislature’s specified requirements.  And “appropriate weight” means that the actor 
must show the same respect for the legislative rules that we can fairly expect of an 
actor who does have accurate beliefs about the relevant facts underlying his self-
defense claim (as explained above). 
 In the end, I confess, I doubt that we can fully solve the problem of 
reconciling the “no belief” approach with both the jurisdiction’s objective, external 
legal requirements and the traditional rule that an actor is normally strictly liable 
despite his reasonable mistake or ignorance about the governing criminal law.  That 
traditional rule is itself in considerable tension with the most defensible conceptions 
of moral fault.  Why, for example, should a defendant with honest and reasonable 
beliefs about most elements of self-defense lose the defense because he 
understandably fails to grasp the intricacies of a state’s retreat rules?44  A more ideal 
legislative standard would provide a defense of honest and reasonable mistake or 
ignorance of law, and then would also provide a concomitantly greater privilege to 
use force when a person exercising reasonable self-control and showing due respect 
for the governing legal standards would do so. 
 
 
                                                 
42 This second constraint, which requires the actor to meet general defense requirements but 
causes the actor to forfeit the defense if he has an inculpatory belief, is considerably weaker 
than the first, which automatically provides a full defense unless the actor has an inculpatory 
belief. 
43 See TAN 52-53= infra. 
44 For example, under the Model Penal Code, one has a general (though narrow) duty to 
retreat if one is planning to use deadly force, §3.04(2)(b), but one has no such duty if assailed 
in his place of work, §3.04(2)(b)(1), but then again, one does have a duty if, when assailed in 
his place of work, he is assailed by someone else who he knows also works there.  Id. 
Page 25 of 38 Simons, RPP and self def. 1/10/08 
 B. The teachings of psychology and neuroscience  
  
 Scientific evidence of how individuals make decisions, in general, and how 
they respond to stress, in particular, provides some support for my approach.  Dual 
processing theories of brain function suggest that many human actions involve, first, 
an immediate, unconscious “System I” response, followed by a more considered, 
reflective “System II” response, which might (or might not) “correct” the initial 
response.45  Indeed, remarkably enough, actors who make fully conscious choices 
often register responses in the “emotional” part of the brain even without the actor’s 
awareness, and those who register such “emotional” responses perform tasks better 
than those who do not.46  It appears, then, that conscious means-end reasoning is 
only one effective path towards realizing one’s ends; intuitive and emotional 
responses can also shape behavior in ways that serve the actor’s goals. 
 Actions in response to a threat of violence certainly fit this general pattern.  
Even when emotional reactions such as fear are not fully conscious, they contain 
significant cognitive content that plays a role in directing and shaping the actor’s 
behavior.  Moreover, reactions to sudden threats also reveal a more particular set of 
characteristics—namely, a pattern of “fight or flight” (or, perhaps more accurately, 
“freeze (hypervigilance), flight, fight, or fright”47).  This pattern of extraordinarily quick 
                                                 
45 See Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S., Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in 
intuitive judgment (in Heuristics & biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment (2002) (ed. T. 
Gilovich, D. Griffin & D. Kahneman), pp. 49–81, Cambridge University Press): 
 
The essence of such a model is that judgments can be produced in two ways (and in 
various mixtures of the two): a rapid, associative, automatic, and effortless intuitive 
process (some times called System 1), and a slower, rule-governed, deliberate and 
effortful process (System 2). System 2 ‘knows’ some of the rules that intuitive 
reasoning is prone to violate, and sometimes intervenes to correct or replace 
erroneous intuitive judgments. Thus, errors of intuition occur when two conditions are 
satisfied: System 1 generates the error and System 2 fails to correct. 
 
See also O.R. Goodenough & K. Prehn, A neuroscientific approach to normative judgment in 
law and justice, 359 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 1709, 1713 (2004). 
46 See Joseph LeDoux, The Emotional Brain 174-178 (1998); Gretchen Vogel, Scientists 
Probe Feelings Behind Decision Making, 275 SCIENCE 1269 (1997) (commenting on Antoine 
Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel & Antonio R. Damasio, Deciding Advantageously 
Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293 (1997)); J. Lehrer, “Followers 
of Passion,” Boston Globe, April 29, 2007, p. E3. 
47 See H. Stefan Bracha, Freeze, Flight, Fight, Fright, Faint: Adaptationist Perspectives on 
the Acute Stress Response Spectrum, 9 CNS Spectrums 679 (2004); see also Bracha et al, 
“Does ‘Fight or Flight’ Need Updating, 45 Psychosomatics 448 (2004) (letter); LeDoux, supra 
note 45=, at 149-150. 
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reactions has obvious adaptive value for the type of emergencies faced by our 
ancestors, such as threats of harm by predators.48  At the same time, these 
spontaneous reactions are sometimes crude, resulting in inaccurate or excessive 
responses to threats.49  Furthermore, there is evidence that fright, like other 
emotions, can trigger mental processing of which the actor is not conscious.  
According to Professor Joseph LeDoux of New York University,  
[F]rightening stimuli were processed by the emotional part of the brain before 
they were processed by the cortex, the seat of conscious thought.  This “low-
road” of sensory processing is almost twice as fast as the “high-road.”  As a 
result, we experience strong emotional reactions before knowing what, 
exactly, we are reacting to.50 
 
 My proposal is consistent with this scientific evidence.  In the fast-moving 
context of a violent attack, it is often unrealistic to expect the person attacked to 
consciously and carefully evaluate the precise extent of a threat, the likely effect of 
his response on the aggressor, and the availability of alternatives.  Yet his emotional 
and intuitive51 reactions will often display a “wisdom” of their own, providing 
unconscious or subconscious insight into the nature of the threat and the 
appropriate, effective possible responses.52 
 
                                                 
48 See LeDoux, supra note 45=, at 163-165.  See also Aaron T. Beck, Prisoners of Hate: the 
Cognitive Basis of Anger, Hostility, and Violence 72 (1999): 
 
When we are confronted with a threat, we have to be able to label the circumstances 
quickly so that an appropriate strategy (fight or flight) can be put into effect.  The 
thought processes activated by threats compress complex information into a 
simplified, unambiguous category as rapidly as possible.  These processes produce 
dichotomous evaluations, such as harmful/harmless, friendly/unfriendly. 
 
49 See id. at 73 ((“primal thinking processes” are generally adaptive for sudden emergencies 
but tend to “crowd[] out our more reflective thinking”). 
50 Lehrer’s article, id., discusses Joseph E. LeDoux et al., The Lateral Amygdaloid Nucleus: 
Sensory Interface of the Amygdala in Fear Conditioning, 10 J. NEUROSCI. 1062 (1990).  For a 
less technical discussion, see Joseph E. LeDoux, The Emotional Brain, Fear, and the 
Amygdala, 23 CELLULAR AND MOLECULAR NEUROBIOLOGY 727 (2003). 
51 Emotions and intuitions are overlapping but sometimes distinct phenomena.  “It is possible 
for humans to make intuitive judgments about the world that have a low level of emotionality.” 
Goodenough & K. Prehn, supra note 44=, at 1717.  In the context of this paper, it is possible 
for a person under attack to respond relatively calmly and to rely on an intuitive judgment 
about what response would be appropriate rather than on a set of explicit beliefs about all the 
legally relevant elements of self-defense. 
52 A recent popular book provides a number of examples supporting this assertion.  See Gavin de 
Becker, The Gift of Fear (1997). 
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 C. Doctrinal wrinkles: “negating beliefs” and “reasonable ignorance”   
 
 Consider two doctrinal wrinkles.  The first, precluding the defense when the 
actor has a “negating” belief inconsistent with a claim of self-defense, qualifies the 
account above (in a small number of cases).  The second, a loosening of self-
defense requirements to encompass reasonable ignorance as well as reasonable 
mistake, appears to be a simpler approach than the one I endorse, but I will argue 
that it is inadequate. 
 
 1.  Negating (inculpatory) beliefs 
 Should we impose a limitation on the assertion of self-defense when the actor 
happens to possess a negating belief, a belief substantively inconsistent with a claim 
of self-defense?  That is, should the actor lose the defense if he actually believes 
facts that would, if true, render his action unjustifiable?  Indeed he should.  If the 
actor actually believes that he is being confronted with a toy gun as a joke, or if he 
actually believes that he could easily use nondeadly force to prevent a deadly attack 
yet chooses to use deadly force instead, he should not be entitled to the defense. 
 An interesting doctrinal example of a distinct negating belief limitation of this 
sort is the modern (Model Penal Code) approach to retreat.  Even when retreat is 
otherwise legally required, the actor is required to do so only “if the actor knows he 
can avoid the necessity of using [deadly] force with complete safety by retreating.”53  
The Model Penal Code treats the quoted language as a limitation on the duty to 
retreat, and thus as an expansion of the right to self-defense.  However, if a 
jurisdiction adopted my proposed approach to the “no belief” scenario, permitting a 
full defense in some cases where the traditional requirement of various beliefs would 
not permit a full defense, then by adopting this quoted language as well, the 
jurisdiction would actually expand the duty to retreat and limit the right to self-
defense.  For the language suggests that even if an actor otherwise demonstrates a 
reasonable degree of self-control, he should lose the defense if he knows that he 
could retreat with complete safety.54 
                                                 
53 MPC §3.04(2)(b)(ii). 
54 Note that negating belief provisions occasionally are included as inculpatory elements of 
offenses (and not just part of defenses).  Consider the MPC's bigamy provision, §230.1 
(1)(a), (d), providing that one is guilty of the offense unless, inter alia, he believes that the 
prior spouse is dead, or reasonably believes that he is legally eligible to remarry.  Similarly, 
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 2.  Reasonable ignorance rather than reasonable self-control? 
 Should we reformulate my argument as simply requiring reasonable 
ignorance (or reasonable lack of belief)?  Perhaps an actor should be entitled to self-
defense only if he honestly and reasonably believes facts that would provide a 
justification, or if he lacks any beliefs about such facts55 and his ignorance or lack of 
belief is “reasonable” (while if his lack of belief is unreasonable, he should not be 
entitled to the defense).  Thus, suppose Jones has plenty of time to think about how 
to react, and calmly chooses to use violent force against the other, but is so 
preoccupied with seeking vengeance that he never forms any beliefs about whether 
his reaction is excessive for purposes of self-defense or whether alternative, less 
violent responses would protect his safety equally well.  Jones’ lack of belief is plainly 
“unreasonable” and he is not entitled to a defense.   
 Expanding self-defense beyond actors who possess honest and reasonable 
beliefs about the legally necessary justifying facts, to encompass actors who are 
reasonably ignorant about the facts, is often sensible.  (This is especially true when 
the actor plausibly concludes that if he makes an effort to acquire information 
sufficient to form a definite belief, he will increase the risk of suffering a violent attack 
and decrease the chance of escape or effective defensive response, as noted 
earlier.)  Moreover, this expansion modifies existing self-defense doctrine less 
radically than my proposal does.  However, this formulation is inadequate, because it 
remains too focused on cognitive states—here, on what a reasonable person would 
actually believe.  And this is problematic for three reasons. 
 First, not all who use defensive force while reasonably ignorant of the 
relevant facts are entitled to a complete defense.  The more complex “reasonable 
self-control” criterion, which encompasses more relevant features of the situation, is 
therefore preferable.  For example, suppose an actor is attacked very suddenly, with 
insulting words and a quick shove to the floor, followed by another shove as he tries 
to stand up.  And suppose the actor then responds with extraordinary uncontrolled 
fury, pushing the assailant violently down a long flight of stairs, thus endangering the 
assailant’s life.  In light of the sudden attack and the need to respond very quickly, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
the MPC defines perjury as making a false statement under oath when the actor “does not 
believe it to be true.”  MPC, §241.1(1).  See also Shute, supra note 18=, at 174. 
55 He still must, I assume, believe that he is being threatened with violence.  See text at note 
12= supra. 
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might be justifiable for this actor not to form any beliefs about the alternatives 
available to him (other than “I need to shove back”), and justifiable for him not to form 
any beliefs about the severity of the force he is inflicting on the attacker (other than “I 
need to protect myself”).  But given the extreme violence of his response, my 
proposed requirement of “reasonable self-control” would deny a full defense.  The 
“reasonable ignorance” approach might permit one.  My approach seems preferable. 
 Second, in some situations an actor who is reasonably ignorant of some of 
the facts should, for that very reason, choose not to use defensive force at all (or at 
least not yet).  So if the reasonable ignorance concerns whether the threat is deadly 
or not, and if the actor knows he could safely wait (because the threat is not yet 
imminent), then the reasonable ignorance test again permits too broad a defense.56  
Third, even when the reasonably ignorant actor is indeed entitled to a full defense, 
this is not simply because he acted while in a state of reasonable lack of belief about 
legally relevant facts, but also because, under all the circumstances, he was not 
culpable in using defensive force.  (In the “blind fury” example from the prior 
paragraph, defendant might indeed have been reasonably ignorant of how much 
harm he would cause, but that does not justify his explosion of rage.)  The 
“reasonable self-control” criterion more faithfully implements this more global 
assessment of culpability. 
 
 
IV. Objections to the proposal 
  
 A. “You can’t escape beliefs” objection 
 
 One objection is that even the supposedly noncognitive “reasonable self-
control” criterion must consider the actor’s beliefs, for we still must make sense of the 
requirement that the actor exercise a socially acceptable degree of self-control. 
 Mustn’t he first consciously realize at least that there is a risk that he could be acting 
                                                 
56 Peter Westen has pointed out to me that a defender of the “reasonable ignorance” approach 
could solve this overbreadth problem by endorsing a narrow version of the approach under which 
the actor must be reasonably ignorant of every feature that bears on culpability regarding self-
defense—including, in my example, imminence as well as proportionality.  This would solve the 
problem, I agree, but at the expense of restricting the “reasonable ignorance” approach to 
extremely rare cases. 
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with excessive or unnecessary force, before we can fairly expect him to exercise 
self-control?  If that is so, then the new proposal has not eliminated or even 
significantly minimized the conscious belief requirement, after all. 
 But conscious awareness of the risk of mistaken or excessive self-defense 
should not be required.  In many scenarios, it is both highly unrealistic and unfair to 
expect actors to advert to such a possibility.  Rather, the cognitive requirement 
should be less stringent: we should insist only that a person with a capacity for self-
control both believe that he is imminently threatened with some degree of violence, 
and react with force for the purpose of defending himself.  And, of course, short of 
demonstrable and serious mental defect, it is fair to expect all people, even in the 
circumstances of self-defense, to be alert to, or at least act in conformity with, their 
general social obligation to act carefully and not too violently. 
 
 B. The objection that scientific evidence shows “reasonable self-control” 
to be incoherent or impossible 
 
 Perhaps the physical responses of the brain to a threat of physical harm are 
sufficiently patterned, predictable, and inexorable that no moral responsibility can be 
attributed to the actor who fails to act with what I call a reasonable degree of self-
control.57 
                                                 
57 Consider the comments of Richard Restak, a neurologist and neuropsychiatrist, about the 
Bernhard Goetz case.  According to Restak: 
 
[T]here are no reasonable people under conditions in which death or severe bodily 
harm are believed imminent. … [E]xpectations [that Goetz should have calmed down 
after the initial threat had passed] are neurologically unrealistic. Once aroused, the 
limbic system can become a directive force for hours, sometimes days, and can 
rarely be shut off like flipping a switch. The heart keeps pounding, the breathing -- 
harsh and labored -- burns in the throat; the thoughts keep churning as fear is 
replaced by anger and finally, murderous rage. At some point in this process 
memories for ongoing events may become permanently lost; false memories may be 
created as the frightened and rageful person lives over and over in his mind the act 
of violence that erupted in him in response to what he perceives as a threat to his life. 
 
… 
 
 Isn't it preferable therefore to face up courageously to these sometimes 
frightening and unpleasant realities instead of pretending that questions such as 
those being asked about Bernhard Goetz can be answered by courtroom 
speculations about how a reasonable person would have responded in his place? 
 To expect reasonable behavior in the face of perceived threat, terror and 
rage is itself a most unreasonable expectation. 
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 In reply, I first note that this objection, in its broadest form, expresses the 
fundamental concern that causal determinism precludes moral responsibility.  
Whether this objection is persuasive is one of the most difficult topics in moral 
philosophy, and I will not take it on in this essay.  My argument, like any other 
deontological or nonconsequentialist argument for self-defense, depends on refuting 
this objection.  I believe, but will not here try to show, that it can be refuted.58 
 But a narrower version of the objection could have differential bite.59  
Suppose there were clear neuroscientific and psychological evidence that people 
threatened with serious harm not only tend to respond predictably in highly patterned 
ways, but also are physically unable to act otherwise.  It would be no more fair to 
punish such a person than to punish a defendant whose arm was physically grabbed 
by another, more powerful actor who used the defendant’s arm to strike the victim. 
 However, even as reformulated, the objection fails to persuade.  Our actual 
experience shows that almost all people under threat of violence are able to 
modulate and control their responses to some degree.  It is exceedingly unlikely that 
most people under threat, or even a substantial subset of them, are literally 
physically compelled or “on automatic pilot” such that they were entirely unable to act 
differently than they in fact acted. 
 
 C. The objection that my proposal treats self-defense as an excuse 
rather than a justification 
 
 The proposal, some might object, is troublingly similar to the test for 
provocation or “heat of passion” as a partial defense to murder (mitigating it to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Richard Restak, The Law: The Fiction of the “Reasonable Man,” The Washington Post, May 
17, 1987.  Restak’s argument obviously assumes that Goetz, and perhaps all other actors 
who actually respond with defensive force, are incapable of acting otherwise than they do, 
and thus cannot fairly be criticized for their reactions. 
58 For some useful discussions of this topic, as applied to criminal responsibility, see Stephen 
J. Morse, The Non-Problem of Free Will in Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 25 Behav. 
Sci. Law 203 (2007; Peter Westen, Getting the Fly out of the Bottle: The False Problem of 
Free Will and Determinism, 8 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 599 (2005). 
59 A recent overview of contemporary neuroscientific evidence that purportedly 
demonstrates lack of criminal responsibility concludes that the evidence for this bold 
claim is inadequate, but also finds strong evidence that some kinds of brain dysfunction 
increase the probability of some kinds of criminal behavior.  D. Mobbs, H. C. Lau, O. D. 
Jones, & C. D. Firth, Law, Responsibility and the Brain, 5 PLoS Biol (April 2007). 
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voluntary manslaughter).  Those tests, at least in their modern incarnations, consider 
whether the defendant exercised a reasonable degree of self-control.60  Similarly, 
modern tests of duress sometimes frame the issue as whether the defendant “was 
coerced … by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person … 
which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to 
resist.”61  And yet the provocation doctrine is often considered a partial excuse, and 
the duress doctrine is often considered a complete excuse.  So, notwithstanding my 
assertion earlier that providing a defense in the “no belief” scenario is sometimes a 
matter of justification, not excuse, the actual test that I suggest—a test of reasonable 
self-control—bears an uncanny and worrisome resemblance to standard doctrines of 
excuse.62 
 This objection is overstated, though it contains a germ of truth.  It is 
overstated because the mere fact that a legal standard refers to self-control does not 
mean that the standard is one of excuse rather than justification.  The reasonable 
person is not devoid of emotions—indeed, if a person reacts with cold indifference to 
a traumatic event, such as the death of a loved one, we have reason to doubt his 
reasonableness, his capacity for empathy, sympathy, and human concern.  Courts 
sometimes speak (especially in voluntary manslaughter cases) as if the relation of 
emotion to reason is a relation of subjective, uncontrolled irrationality to calm, sober 
                                                 
60 See MPC §210.3 (1)(b) (manslaughter includes “a homicide which would otherwise be 
murder [that] is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for 
which there is reasonable explanation or excuse”); People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 
1976)(“[T]his heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the 
mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances” (quoting 
People v. Logan, 164 P. 1121, 1122 (Cal. 1917)); People v. Manriquez, 123 P.3d 614, 640 
(Cal. 2005). 
61 Model Penal Code §2.09(1) (emphasis added). 
62 Another objection based on the alleged similarity to provocation is that the “reasonably” 
provoked defendant only obtains a partial, not a full, defense; so why do I endorse a full defense 
for the actor who exercises reasonable self-control?  This objection is unpersuasive because it 
misunderstand the function of the “reasonableness” requirement in heat of passion doctrine: its 
function is not to identify when a person is so seriously provoked that the killing is fully excusable, 
but instead to identify when a provoked defendant is understandably strongly tempted to react 
with violence, because it is understandable that he would become highly emotional in response to 
the provocation.  See Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a 
Rationale, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminol. 421 (1982). 
 At the same time, even if a defendant who justifiably has no beliefs about some of the 
legally relevant aspects of self-defense does not exercise reasonable self-control, sometimes he 
might deserves a partial defense, analogous to provocation and also to imperfect self-defense.  
For the latter category permits punishment for a lesser crime, such as involuntary manslaughter 
rather than murder, when a defendant honestly but unreasonably believes the facts are such as 
would warrant a complete defense.  See Dressler, supra note 3=, at 239-240. 
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reflection.  Thus, they speak of the danger of emotion “dethroning” reason.63  But 
emotions have cognitive content: in the specific context of self-defense, the emotions 
of fear and foreboding are valuable epistemic guides to danger.64  And the fact that 
an attack puts an actor into a highly emotional state of fear, anger, or indignation is 
perfectly consistent with the actor’s conduct being fully justifiable. 
 Indeed, my proposal that we evaluate whether the defendant exercised a 
reasonable degree of “control” over his emotions risks validating this incorrect view 
that emotions are legally relevant only insofar as they “dethrone reason.”  That is 
why I also suggest that, in applying the test, a jury should inquire whether the 
defendant acted reasonably in the circumstances, taking into account the beliefs he 
justifiably held, the beliefs he justifiably lacked, and the emotions he justifiably felt. 
 Moreover, although the use of a “reasonableness” limitation in both 
provocation and duress doctrine might seem to indicate that the doctrine must be an 
instance of justification rather than excuse,65 this conclusion is incorrect.  
                                                 
63 See, e.g., State v. McDermott, 449 P.2d 545, 548 (Kan. 1969), discussed in Cynthia Lee, 
Murder and the Reasonable Person, supra note 33=, p. 263.  Consider Martha Nussbaum, 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 24-25 (2001), critiquing the common 
view 
 
that emotions are “non-reasoning movements,” unthinking energies that simply push 
the person around, without being hooked up to the ways in which she perceives or 
thinks about the world.  Like gusts of wind or the currents of the sea, they move, and 
move the person, but obtusely, without vision of an object or beliefs about it.  … 
Sometimes this view is connected with the idea that emotions derive from an “animal” 
part of our nature… 
 
Nussbaum objects that 
 
this view, while picking out certain features of emotional life that real and important, 
has omitted others of equal and greater importance, central to the identity of an 
emotion and to discriminations between one emotion and another: their aboutness, 
their intentionality, their basis in beliefs, their connection with evaluation. 
 
Id. at 33. 
64 See de Becker, supra note 42=; LeDoux, supra note 45=.  For further discussion of the 
relationship of emotion to “rational” or “reasonable” action, see Horder, supra note 22=, at 74 
(“Actions in anger, or out of fear, can be rationally or truly justified, in that the experience of 
the emotions in question may be what helps us to behave rationally or in a fully justifiable 
way” (footnote omitted)); Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996) (arguing for an “evaluative” conception of 
emotion over a “mechanistic” conception that simply evaluates the degree to which emotions, 
of whatever sort, interfere with the actor’s power of self-control); Ronald de Sousa, "Emotion," 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL 
= <http:// plato.stanford.edu/ archives/ spr2003/ entries/ emotion/>. 
65 See Westen & Mangiafico, The Criminal Law of Duress: A Justification, Not an Excuse—And 
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“Reasonableness” is a protean concept, sometimes operating as a short-hand for 
rules of conduct that a different decision-maker is to specify, sometimes as a 
normative standard of ideal or socially acceptable behavior (in offense definitions 
and in justification defenses), and sometimes as a normative standard of 
understandable behavior that is not socially acceptable (in excuse defenses).66  In 
provocation and duress, it serves the latter role.  Thus, in these contexts, it might be 
defensible to interpret “reasonable” as average behavior, or even behavior that a 
substantial minority of the population would engage in, while this interpretation would 
be unacceptable if part of the definition of “reasonable care” in an offense definition 
or in a justification defense.67 
 The germ of truth in the objection is that excuse does properly play a role in 
some of these “no belief” cases.  Insofar as the actor has very little time to think, or is 
understandably in a panicky, overwhelmed, highly confused, or highly frightened 
frame of mind, these factors are properly considered in determining whether his 
action was excusable, even if not justifiable (i.e., not commendable or permissible).68  
But I also believe that actors who are not clearly in a frame of mind that warrants a 
full excuse, and who nevertheless fail to form the affirmative beliefs that traditional 
self-defense doctrine requires, are entitled to a full defense if they satisfy the criteria I 
have articulated.  Although these actors do not readily qualify for an excuse, I have 
tried to show that we have good reason to treat them as justified. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Why It Matters, 6 Buffalo Crim. L. Rev. 833, 897-900, 907-909 (2003); John Gardner, The Gist of 
Excuses, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 575, 579 (1998).  See also Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and 
Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1618 (1994); Antony Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal 
Liability, 12 Law & Phil. 345, 358 (1993). 
66 For an overview, see Kenneth W. Simons, Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law, 
3 Theoretical Inq. in L. 283 (2002).  On “reasonableness” tests and excuse, see id. at 314-315; 
Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463, 551-552 (1992); Duff, supra note 22=, at 
61-68. 
67 The average Boston driver does not use reasonable care, I can affirm as a long-time 
resident of the city. 
68 Imagine, for example, that the defendant is suffering intense and inescapable pain at the 
hands of the aggressor, who is twisting his arm high up behind his back.  Cf. Horder, supra 
note 22=, at 85.  If the defendant lashes out in violent response in order to stop the pain, we 
might want to treat the response as excused, but not necessarily justified. 
Page 35 of 38 Simons, RPP and self def. 1/10/08 
 D. The Bernhard Goetz objection 
 
 Would my proposal make it easier for a homophobe, or a racist, or a person 
relying on racist stereotypes, to obtain a complete defense?  Suppose that Goetz 
(who is white) credibly testified that he was so overwhelmed with fear of the four 
African-American youths who he believed were attacking him in a New York City 
subway that he never formed any clear beliefs about the severity of the threat they 
posed, the likely severity of his response, or the available alternatives.69  Wouldn’t 
my approach justify acquittal, even if his fear was based entirely upon a highly 
inaccurate racial stereotype?  Indeed, the defense strategy in Goetz included the 
claim that, after firing the first shot, Goetz was on “automatic pilot,” so that he was 
not really to blame for the later shots; they were essentially involuntary.70  Isn’t the 
possibility of encouraging such claims further proof of the perils of a vague 
“reasonable self-control” test? 
 Whether an actor is ever justified in considering race when deciding to 
employ force in self-defense is a difficult question.71  Surely certain motives for the 
use of defensive force (such as outright racial hostility or homophobia) should render 
the use of that force impermissible.  Perhaps my proposal makes it slightly easier, as 
a practical matter, for actors with such illegitimate motives to obtain acquittals.  
Compare the traditional requirement that the actor possess affirmative conscious 
beliefs in all of the facts necessary to justify his conduct: this more demanding 
requirement will tend to bar some self-defense claims in which a racist motive 
                                                 
69 To be sure, in his confession, Goetz proudly claimed to have formulated clear beliefs about 
all of these matters.  Specifically, he claimed that if he had had more bullets, he would have 
fired again and again until the supposed assailants were dead, without regard to whether 
they were posing a continued threat.  497 N.E. 2d 41, 44 (N.Y. 1986).  At trial, however, the 
jury discounted the credibility of much of the confession. 
70 See George P. Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial 
30-31 (1988). 
71 Stephen Garvey has recently questioned the received view that the use of self-defense is 
invariably impermissible when affected by racial stereotypes.  He argues that even under a 
test of self-defense requiring honest and “reasonable” beliefs, it is inconsistent with the 
commitments of a liberal state to cause a person to forfeit the right to self-defense because 
his honest belief that he needed to use deadly force was influenced by racism or racial 
stereotypes.  Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 New Crim. L. 
Rev. _ (2008) (SSRN draft of June 11, 2007).  But see Jody Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of 
Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes," 46 Stan. L. Rev. 
781 (1994); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Towards a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 367 (1996) (proposing race-switching jury 
instructions to encourage jurors to suppress their unconscious racism and stereotypes). 
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underlies the decision to use force.  Still, it will not bar all such claims, so the 
question is one of degree.  I am not convinced that the slightly increased risk of 
permitting a defense to one motivated by racism is sufficient reason to reject my 
proposal—especially since the proposal could be supplemented, in appropriate 
cases, with an instruction about the legal impermissibility of acting upon a racist 
reason. 
 
 E. A risk of encouraging law enforcement misconduct? 
 
 Would the proposal too readily excuse police and other law enforcement 
officials who respond to supposed threats unthinkingly, impulsively, and excessively?  
Would it result in too many Joseph Diallo or Rodney King tragedies?72 
 I don’t believe so.  Properly understood, the proposal addresses private 
citizens who are suddenly confronted with a violent threat.  Police and other law 
enforcement officials, by contrast, are trained to deal with these situations.  They are 
thus much more likely actually to form beliefs as to relevant facts.  And if they do not 
form such beliefs but simply react, they should at least be judged by the standard of 
a reasonable officer with the requisite training, a much more demanding standard 
than should apply to a private citizen surprised by an act of violence. 
 
 
 F. The pragmatic objection 
 
 Perhaps you are right in theory, the pragmatist concedes.  But it is too 
dangerous to discard the cognitive approach and open the doors to a free-wheeling 
“reasonable degree of self-control” criterion.  Jurors so instructed might tend to give 
a full defense to those who acted somewhat understandably but wrongly; the jurors 
might too easily conclude that the victim, overwhelmed by fear, cannot be blamed, 
and should be fully excused or justified, and they might fail to recognize that fear 
                                                 
72 The 1999 Amadou Diallo incident, in which New York City police killed an innocent, 
unarmed man after shooting 41 bullets into his body, is often viewed as the paradigm of 
unjustified, impulsive police over-reaction.  The truth appears to be more complicated, 
however.  Some view the police’s conduct as based on a tragic mistake: one of the officers at 
the scene stumbled to the ground, and the other officers understandably believed that Diallo 
had shot him.  For a thorough account, see Jeffrey Toobin, "The Unasked Question," The 
New Yorker, March 6, 2000. 
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does not excuse or justify any and all responses.  Or, conversely, they might tend to 
award the defense too sparingly, improperly assuming that it is relatively easy for a 
person to react calmly and sensibly in response to a threat. 
 This objection worries me, especially the risk that the criterion will open the 
flood-gates to implausible or weak claims for a full defense.  At the same time, 
insofar as the objection rests on the greater vagueness of the proposal relative to the 
“honest and reasonable belief” standard, I concur with those who point out that 
vagueness in the definition of a defense is much less problematic than vagueness in 
the definition of the affirmative elements of a crime.73  Moreover, if vagueness is 
considered to be a significant problem, it would be possible to qualify the reasonable 
self-control approach even more than I already have, as follows: the jury could be 
instructed that ordinarily, what is a sensible and acceptable response is equivalent to 
what a person who had time to think about the alternatives would do.74  This is, 
however, an arbitrary qualification, in tension with the arguments presented above. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Most modern criminal law theorists and much modern criminal legislation 
endorse a cognitivist form of culpability, focusing on the beliefs that an actor had, or 
should have had, when engaging in wrongful behavior.  This is understandable.  A 
focus on beliefs is part of a reassuringly straightforward, rationalist conception of 
culpability.  Only when actors choose evil or wrongdoing, with sufficiently clear and 
precise beliefs about the legally relevant circumstances, do they properly incur 
                                                 
73 See Glanville Williams, Necessity, 1978 Crim. L. Rev. 128, 130. 
74 Another pragmatic objection relates to the burden of persuasion.  The implications of my 
proposal vary significantly depending on whether the state has the burden of disproving the 
defense, or the defendant has the burden of proving it.  I have implicitly assumed that the 
defendant has the burden; thus, I have been concerned about cases in which a defendant 
lacks one or more legally required beliefs, and responds to a threat justifiably, yet is required 
to prove those beliefs—a very difficult burden (unless the jury exercises its discretion to nullify 
the law).  But suppose instead that once the defendant satisfies his burden of production and 
provides some minimal evidence of the legally required beliefs, the state must disprove 
beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s possession of those beliefs.  In such a jurisdiction, in 
ambiguous situations, defendants has a greater chance of being acquitted.  So long as there 
is minimal evidence that defendant might have had all the necessary exculpatory beliefs, the 
prosecution will often have difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not.  In 
short, my proposal will make much less practical difference, relative to current law, if the state 
has the burden of disproving the defense. 
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serious blame.  And if they engage in otherwise wrongful action that is justifiable, 
they continue to incur blame unless they choose to take the justified action for all of 
the right reasons and with all the right beliefs. 
 But this picture of culpability is a caricature of a more complex reality.  Self-
defense scenarios illustrate with special vividness that the cognitivist portrayal is 
inaccurate and unpersuasive.  Whether or not my own proposal is a convincing and 
workable alternative to current cognitivist tests of self-defense doctrine, I hope that 
this paper has suggested reasons for questioning and revising the traditional model. 
